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Introduction 
During the Early Roman Empire in Asia Minor, the setting for this case study, actors in 
Rome (usually the emperor or the senate) and proconsuls, provincial governors stationed within 
the provinces, worked together to serve Roman interests.
1
 In this study, I will examine the ways 
in which the provinces in Asia Minor posed a great challenge to the following Roman interests: 
I. the enforcement of Roman and local law; II. the preservation of political stability; III. the 
maintenance of provincial infrastructure and finances. This case study will provide a greater 
understanding of the challenges that arose in governing Roman provinces. 
In order to evaluate the Anatolian provinces, I will use as evidence the Epistulae, letters, 
of Pliny the Younger and the Discourses, which are mostly orations, of Dio Chrysostom. Pliny‘s 
letters provide the perspective of Roman governors, while Dio‘s orations reveal the 
circumstances of urban Greeks and city politics. These sources also, however valuable, have 
their limitations as their authors have motivations for writing their works in addition to simply 
providing information. Pliny is motivated to present himself as an ideal governor, while Dio 
speaks of abstract philosophical concepts more than mundane realities. Therefore, it is prudent to 
proceed with caution and skepticism when analyzing these works. 
 
Political Context 
 An introduction to the framework for Roman governance and the political situation in 
Asia Minor will aid in the understanding of this study. As Andrew Lintott expertly puts it, ―in the 
Greek world the Roman aim was, first, to ensure that the cities obeyed any general rules laid 
down for the province, whether in an all-embracing lex provinciae or on separate occasions‖ and 
―to apply through proconsular authority both laws that the Romans applied to themselves … and 
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other regulations devised by emperors or the senate for the provinces.‖2 By 27 BCE, at least, 
Roman provinces were divided between the senate and the emperor. Generally, if a province was 
peaceful and housed few troops, the senate appointed the governor, but if a province was 
threatened and home to large numbers of troops, the emperor controlled the province himself or 
appointed a proconsul.
3
 These appointed proconsuls had great freedom in governing their 
provinces, but they were answerable to and subject to instructions from the emperor and the 
senate.
4
 Such communication as Pliny‘s letters to and from Trajan, sent between Bithynia et 
Pontus and Rome, allowed for Rome‘s political center to remain active in controlling persons 
and resources, gathering and processing information, and keeping records of decisions made in 
the provinces.
5 
 But just as Romans were active in provincial administrations, the Greeks themselves 
were mostly self-governing. In order that the task of governing the province was not 
unmanageable for a proconsul and his staff, Rome ―maintained the [Greek] poleis within a wide-
reaching framework under a unified administration,‖ made use of local government, and 
encouraged its development.
6
 The existing city governments generally had annual magistrates, 
the most notable being the office of archôn, one or more city councils (boulês), which probably 
possessed a membership around 300 and 400 members in larger cities, and an assembly 
(ekklêsia). The office of archôn was the highest within the city held by a small number of men, 
with a leading or senior archôn in charge. He presided over the boulê and the ekklêsia and was 
the most visible leading figure in the city. The legal enactments of Greek cities required approval 
from both the boulê and the ekklêsia, though sometimes the latter‘s purpose was simply to ratify 
the proposals prepared by the boulê.
7
 Because the boulê had property requirements for 
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membership and because, in some cities, new members were required to pay a fee upon entry, it 
is likely that politics in these cities were dominated by an elite inner circle.
8 
 
Source: Pliny the Younger 
 A short overview of Pliny the Younger‘s life, his position as governor of Bithynia et 
Pontus, and his collection of letters as a source will aid in the understanding of this study. Pliny 
was born in CE 61 or 62 and was educated in Rome. His uncle, the Elder Pliny, died in the 
eruption of Vesuvius and left his estate to his adopted nephew, who took the name Gaius Plinius 
Luci filius Caecilius Secundus. He followed the cursus honorum, serving, among other public 
duties, as a treasurer and a lawyer. He was eventually appointed by Emperor Trajan to be a 
proconsul in Bithynia et Pontus, where he probably died around 113 CE.
9 
 Pliny‘s term as proconsul began in 111 CE and because a successor in Bithynia et Pontus 
is not recorded until 113-114, the exact termination of Pliny‘s term as proconsul is unknown, 
though many scholars believe that Pliny died while in office.
10
 Before Trajan, Bithynia et Pontus 
was a public province governed by proconsuls of praetorian rank. The senate passed a decree 
under Trajan, converting the province into an imperial province, administered by a legatus 
Augusti pro praetore. Pliny was sent as such a legatus, with proconsular power.
11
 As governor, 
Pliny spent the majority of his time addressing the affairs of cities and prominent individuals 
within the province, as was the practice of most provincial governors, who had time only to visit 
more populous areas.
12
 Pliny was not only stationed in his province in order to act in a regular 
legal capacity, by upholding existing laws, hearing cases, ensuring Roman and provincial 
security, and collecting taxes, for example, but also to report regularly to Trajan, who showed a 
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keen interest in Bithynia et Pontus, only objecting twice to Pliny‘s decision to trouble him with 
trivial issues.
13 
 Trajan‘s interest in the province manifested itself in special mandata, commands, that he 
issued to Pliny before his departure that he would have to observe while in office. These 
mandata were issued to address concerns specific to Bithynia et Pontus at this time. According to 
Sherwin-White, Pliny assumed ―the role of curator for all the cities‖ of the province.14 That is, 
Pliny was sent to address financial wastefulness, mostly as a result of extravagant public building 
projects.
15
 In order to explain why Pliny rarely consulted Trajan about city finances themselves, 
Sherwin-White concludes that ―in this sphere Pliny was a master.‖ He goes on to explain that 
Pliny ―had spent four or five years at the head of the Roman treasuries and needed no 
guidance.‖16 However, according to Woolf, that Pliny was sent to his province with special 
financial responsibilities is ―not really testable‖ since Pliny devotes special attention alongside 
municipal finances to building projects, the military, and the imperial cult.
17
 That Pliny devotes 
special attention to other issues, including the ban on social and political clubs,
18
 which 
themselves most likely other mandata, is certainly true. However, a majority of scholars do agree 
that Pliny‘s primary mandatum concerned correcting city finances in his province.19 
Additionally, two letters from Trajan himself speak of a ―special mission‖ involving the 
inspection of city finances.
20
 Because mandata were designed to limit the imperium of a 
proconsul, questions of interpretation often required communication with the emperor, often in 
the form of letters such as Pliny‘s.21 Overall, these mandata are very useful for revealing the 
Romans‘ chief concerns within the province. 
 The Epistulae of Pliny afford modern readers a detailed look at provincial administration, 
but there remains some doubt concerning the authenticity of the letters. In Pliny‘s letters to 
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Trajan, he attempts to present himself as a thoughtful governor and a personal friend of Trajan, 
while Trajan in his letters to Pliny presents himself as a civilis princeps who concerns himself 
with justice, the well-being of Romans and provincials, and healthy relationships with his 
subordinates.
22 
 
Source: Dio Chrysostom 
A short overview of Dio Chrysostom‘s life, his political and social standing, and his 
collection of orations as a source will aid in the understanding of this study. Dio Cocceianus 
Chrysostomus, as he is now known to historians, was born a citizen of Prusa, a city in Bithynia et 
Pontus ca. 40 CE.
23
 His maternal grandfather, and therefore his mother as well, was a Roman 
citizen and he was also a generous benefactor of Prusa.
24
 Bekker-Nielsen speculates that Dio‘s 
mother married below her own status, since Dio‘s father was a peregrinus and passed on that 
status to his son.
25
 We know little of Dio‘s father, but Bekker-Nielsen speculates that Dio‘s 
father was a moneylender who offered loans without security at high interest rates because of 
Dio‘s reference to his father‘s large, but small in value, fortune.26 
At any rate, Dio was still a member of the local elite and held property of notable value. 
For example, he possessed vineyards, cattle, a house in the city, and workshops which he rented 
out.
27
 In his early adult life, Dio held political offices in his city, until he had the opportunity to 
journey to Rome, where he enjoyed exposure to the Roman elite.  During the reign of Domitian, 
Dio was sent into exile from Rome and from his native city due to his friendship with one of 
Domitian‘s enemies. During the period of his exile, he assumed the role of a philosopher and 
traveled extensively about the empire, delivering orations to various cities, their assemblies, and 
their councils. In December of 96, upon Domitian‘s death, Dio‘s exile was ended by Emperor 
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Nerva, from whom Dio inherited the name Cocceianus, and he received a warm welcome in his 
native city of Prusa.
28
 However, Dio had lost his political capital during his exile and his estate 
had fallen into ruin.
29
 Although Dio chose not to participate officially in the political affairs of 
Prusa, he would for the rest of his life act as a political advisor with reasonable sway over the 
city‘s boulê and ekklêsia. Following in his father‘s footsteps, Dio‘s son eventually won a place 
on the boulê and possibly became an archôn.
30
 However, Dio‘s last years were not happy, with 
the loss of his son who had showed promise in his political career, and the loss of his wife.
31 
 Although Dio held no office after his exile, even refusing his city‘s wish to make him 
archôn, his fame was widely celebrated within and without Prusa. Dio often claims intimate 
friendship with the emperor, both during the reign of Nerva and the reign of Trajan.
32
 He also 
speaks of his friendship with ―many others who may be called the most influential among the 
Romans.‖33 Although this claim may have been meant to bolster his position in Prusa, many of 
his listeners believed him.
34
 Furthermore it is certainly possible that Dio had known Nerva 
before his exile. Additionally, Dio did meet Emperor Trajan and addressed four orations to him. 
Trajan likely found interest in accommodating Dio, since showing kindness to a victim of 
Domitian would help him distance his reign from Domitian‘s.35 Dio also boasts his prestige 
among Greek cities, those that ―vied to have him as counselor.‖ Indeed, as Salmeri put it, ―with 
the reputation he had gained for oratorical skills and, above all, sound wisdom, he was much 
sought after‖ and Dio ―considered no Greek city foreign to his competence.‖36  
 On the other hand, Dio‘s fame also earned him many enemies. Bekker-Nielsen speculates 
that Dio was a social climber who would have been held in contempt by those already at the top, 
and would have been demonized by his some of his fellow Prusans for father‘s practice of 
money-lending.
37
 Throughout his political orations, Dio is forced to defend himself from many 
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charges, including lying about friendship with the emperor, mishandling Prusa‘s embassy to 
Rome, conspiring with a Roman proconsul, filling seats in the boulê with his own men, and 
taking other tyrannical and demagogical actions.
38
 In addition to Dio‘s reputation, his ability to 
complete his public building projects was also threatened by his opponents, members of Prusa‘s 
political and social elite.
39
 Bekker-Nielsen speculates that Dio‘s opponents were put off by Dio‘s 
success in convincing Trajan to allow the addition of members to the boulê, since new members, 
because they would be recruited from the top down, would be drawn from a lower class.
40
 The 
social elite in Prusa saw Dio as a threat to their positions. 
 Dio‘s Discourses provide a detailed look into urban life in Greek cities. Bekker-Nielsen 
believes that Dio‘s orations survive as they were reconstructed from his speaking notes. He also 
suggests that Dio regularly did not write his speeches out and would have reason not to do so in 
addresses to the boulê, since ―Dio was unable to foresee which course they day‘s discussion 
would take.‖  In the ekklêsia, Bekker-Nielsen speculates that Dio would rely upon a partially-
written speech with practiced themes, leaving parts to be improvised.
41
 In addition to the 
fragmentary nature of some of his orations, Dio‘s personal interests threaten the authenticity of 
his orations. Bekker-Nielsen observes that prior to his exile, Dio identified with the local elite in 
Prusa, but after his exile and his turn toward philosophy, he avoided holding a formal office in 
politics and instead took on the role of a ―philosopher-advisor.‖ Bekker-Nielsen speculates that 
this change was spawned by exposure to Roman high society, which had little interest in the high 
offices of provincial cities that Dio had previously held in the high regard. Thus, after his exile, 
the political prestige to be found in Prusa seemed insubstantial.
42
 Consequently, Dio falls into a 
category, as Salmeri describes, of new intellectuals—―rhetors and philosophers, or personages 
qualified as both, who plunged into the political life of their cities in the turbulent middle years 
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of the first century BC and gave political life a decidedly ‗personalist‘ appearance.‖43 This 
explains Dio‘s philosophical tendencies, such as discussing the general concepts of homónoia, 
concord, and stásis, discord, which were ―favourite themes in Greek political philosophy,‖ while 
avoiding the discussion of mundane details.
44
 It is uncertain whether some of Dio‘s orations were 
meant to address real problems occurring in the cities that he visited or simply to educate his 
audience on a philosophical matter.  
 
I. Law 
 One of the primary interests of Rome in its provinces was the enforcement of Roman law 
and, where local law was permitted, assurance that these laws were observed faithfully. In Asia 
Minor, Rome‘s ability to enforce law was incomplete and as a result, provincials regularly 
violated, whether consciously or unconsciously, all manners of Roman and local law.  
 Roman officials encountered problems within the Anatolian provinces because the legal 
codes and precedents for governing these provinces were insufficient to address their problems. 
One famous example is the practice of Christianity within the province of Bithynia et Pontus, 
which prompted Pliny, who had no standard punishment for the practice of Christianity to follow 
and who feared to overstep the limits of his imperium, to consult Emperor Trajan for guidance. 
Trajan confirms that Pliny‘s decision, which was to only punish Christians who refused to honor 
the gods, had been correct, but he also tells Pliny not to actively seek out Christians.
45
 Had 
Trajan not been consulted, Pliny may have applied a more rigorous prosecution of Christians, 
which, while justifiable under existing Roman law, would have been detrimental to the interests 
of Rome. 
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 In another example, Pliny had access to laws and precedents dealing with a particular 
problem, but covered areas outside of his jurisdiction. Pliny was approached by fosterers in his 
province who hoped ―that Pliny would reverse the local custom in favor of the Roman rule which 
enabled them to recover their costs when threptoí [foundlings] were claimed.‖46 He was unable 
to decide what course of action to take, even after consulting an ―edict referring to Adania‖ 
issued by Augustus, letters from Vespasian and Titus to the Spartans, a letter from Titus to the 
Achaeans, letters from Domitian to governors Avidius Nigrinus and Armenius Brocchus, and a 
letter from Domitian to the Spartans. These laws and precedents failed to apply to the empire 
generally and Pliny also feared that some of the letters were inaccurate or forgeries, so he 
appealed to Trajan to receive a general ruling.
47
 Even Trajan, in response, admitted that he could 
find nothing in his records that would apply to Pliny‘s province or the empire at large and he was 
unwilling to apply the laws of other regions to Bithynia et Pontus. Consequently, Trajan made a 
decision relevant to the present case, to favor the Greek custom, but, unwilling to make a general 
ruling, left decision the issue undecided for other provinces.
48 
Similarly, when Pliny had been asked by provincials to preside over cases dealing with 
granting free-born rights to former slaves in accordance with a letter from Domitian and with 
precedent established by previous proconsuls, he had to consult Trajan on how to proceed, since 
he lacked any formal ruling on the subject and was unsure whether such a grant would violate 
the limitations of his imperium. A decree made by the Senate relating to such cases had no 
provision for provinces except those with senatorial governors. Even when Trajan received 
Pliny‘s letter, he had no solution to offer to Pliny, for even with access to archives in Rome, 
Trajan and his staff could not locate the senatorial decree to which Pliny had referred.
49
 
Additionally, when Pliny sent a petition to Trajan from the city of Nicaea, which dealt with a 
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right granted to the city by Augustus, Trajan was unsure whether this grant was actually made. In 
response, he ordered Pliny to investigate with help from his procurators.
50
 Such grants were not 
always formal or documented, which created great confusion for later administrators with no 
access to definitive records. Sherwin-White, more generally, observes that ―there seem to have 
been no organized public archives in the province at this time.‖51 
Pliny, who had often lacked laws and precedent to take legal action in his province, 
decided to ask Trajan to send rescripts that would afford future governors some guidance when 
addressing the same problems. For example, Pliny asked Trajan if he would set a ―permanent 
regulation,‖ determining whether or not cities have priority over private creditors in the 
collection of debts, just as the imperial treasury had priority over other collectors. Trajan, 
however, told Pliny that he had no right to establish a general rule, instead preferring to leave the 
ruling to the cities themselves, despite how convenient a general ruling would be for 
administering Bithynia et Pontus.
52
 Similarly, in dealing with the entrance fee for men joining 
the senate in various cities, Pliny asked Trajan for a fixed sum so that each fee would be the 
same amount and again, Trajan, saying that ―it is impossible for [him] to lay down a general 
rule,‖ declared that each city should decide for itself.53 In yet another instance, Trajan tells Pliny 
that no general rule can be established in the punishing of peoples charged of practicing 
Christianity.
54
 In these cases, Trajan was not failing his duties as an emperor, but exercising his 
preference for local customs and case-by-case governance. Nevertheless, Pliny, like many other 
Roman officials who sought to create uniformity when preferable,
55
 was left with a more 
difficult task of governing his province and would likely, due to similar ambiguities in the proper 
application of his imperium, be forced to appeal time and again to Trajan for guidance.
56
 The 
picture that emerges from these examples is of proconsuls identifying many problems in their 
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Anatolian provinces, but lacking the legal grounds to exercise their imperia to solve them. After 
taking time to check legal codes, even ones from outside of their provinces, proconsuls would 
have to send a letter to Rome and to wait for a response before they would have permission to 
take action. Such delays could potentially compound the severity of the original problem. 
 Because various cities in the Roman provinces, including Greek cities in Asia Minor, 
possessed special rights and statuses and because these cities had to be governed separately from 
ordinary provincial cities, proconsuls had to be extra careful when exercising their imperium 
within them. The common lack of formal rules regarding privileged cities and the lacking 
documentation of such grants caused great confusion for proconsuls, who were often told by 
provincials, sometimes incorrectly, that they were exempt from certain rulings. For example, the 
city of Amisus, a free city which was permitted to administer its own laws, attempted to form a 
benefit society, which would directly violate Trajan‘s ban on such organizations. Pliny, who had 
been charged in his mandata to monitor organizations, was left to consult Trajan, who informed 
him that although such a society would violate the ban, Amisus was a special case and granted an 
exception.
57 
 Many cities, such as Rhodes, Tarsus, and Apameia had received special privileges 
because of their loyalty or assistance to Rome.
58
 Dio speaks of an attempt to secure a special 
status for his native city of Prusa by means of an embassy to the emperor, but he admits that 
legal independence ―is sometimes impossible to acquire.‖59 Obviously, with so many other cities 
already possessing such benefits, the Romans did not desire to create further confusion by 
granting such privileges easily. 
 The provincials of Asia Minor made the enforcement of law ever more difficult by 
wasting the administrators‘ time with trivial and falsified cases. A very telling example of this 
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practice is the case brought before Pliny by Claudius Eumpolus, who was acting on behalf of 
Flavius Archippus, against Dio Chrysostom. The two separate charges were that Dio refused to 
give his accounts for the public building project that he had planned and that Dio had engaged in 
an act of desecration, by burying his wife and son in the same building that housed a statue of the 
emperor.
60
 Pliny asked Trajan how to proceed, being especially careful to not overstep his 
imperium in a case that concerned his mandata and that also concerned a statue of the emperor. 
In response, Trajan brushed off both charges, thinking it absurd to concern himself with a statue 
and, having received Dio‘s defense along with Pliny‘s letter, telling Pliny that Dio had never 
refused to give his accounts and just to be sure that Dio does allow his accounts to be 
inspected.
61
 We know from other letters that Flavius Archippus, the man for whom Eumpolus 
had brought these charges against Dio, was another philosopher.
62
 We can infer from these trivial 
charges that had no real chance of incriminating Dio that Archippus and Dio were rivals and that 
this use of the Roman legal system was just another arena in which a Greek provincial could 
attack one of his rivals. 
In addition to special cases of personal rivalries played out through use of the Roman 
court system, other practices of abusing the system were employed. For example, Pliny, when 
asking how to address the practice of Christianity within his province, wondered if he should 
take note of a circulating pamphlet that contained the names of people suspected of practicing 
Christianity. Although Trajan tells Pliny to ignore such pamphlets, since their accuracy cannot be 
verified, the pamphlets reveal a way in which the provincials could use Roman law to harm their 
enemies or at the very least to tarnish their reputations.
63
 Lintott observes that many court cases 
in the provinces were referred upward to proconsuls, other magistrates, and even to emperors and 
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also notes that ―if cases and problems were not referred upwards, politics and jurisdiction could 
have proceeded in an autonomous fashion, without intervention by the Romans.‖64 
 Also, in most Greek communities under Roman rule, provincials often made requests for 
intervention in general local affairs. Some requests were made with the intent to use the Romans 
to harm other provincials, while other requests were made for lack of certainty concerning their 
sovereignty. Governors who paid close attention to the municipal affairs within their provinces 
instilled a sense of wariness among local officials, who did not wish to overstep their authority. 
A simple consultation or deferment to a Roman official would prevent accidental illegal actions, 
but would also occupy that official‘s precious time.65 
 Roman officials had a difficult time deciding how to exercise their imperium both legally 
and effectively in cases where a Roman or local law had been disregarded or unconsciously 
violated in a widespread area. For example, Pliny asked Trajan if he should remove provincial 
councilmen from office who held citizenship in other cities. He knew that although holding 
multiple citizenships was prohibited, many councilors in most cities in Bithynia et Pontus had 
acquired them anyway, but he also knew that to punish that many rich and important men would 
have dire consequences on local politics throughout the province and would instill a hatred for 
Roman rule. Predictably, Trajan instructs Pliny to leave these men in office, but to enforce the 
prohibition of holding multiple citizenships in the future.
66
 In another example, Pliny knew that 
proconsuls were ―free to vary the penalty‖ of certain crimes and decided to consult Trajan 
concerning the prosecution of Christians, which, if he were to simply uphold the law, would 
require him to inflict capital punishment on a wide scale. He knew how difficult it would be to 
hunt down the numerous Christians in his province and knew that such a mass hunt of ordinary 
people would greatly disturb the peace. It is easy to understand why Trajan would tell Pliny to 
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enforce the law when necessary, but not to actively seek out illegal Christians.
67
 In both cases, 
the law could not be enforced to the letter for fear of political disorder, which was in the 
Romans‘ interest to avoid. Instead, the proconsul, after checking with the emperor, was forced to 
adopt a lenient policy of enforcement. 
 Additionally, Roman officials had difficulty with illegal actions that had been taken over 
long periods of time and that had sometimes been established as local precedents. For example, 
Pliny noticed the use of criminals who had been sentenced to work in the mines to do the work 
of public slaves. Although Pliny knew that, in order to ensure that local laws were being 
faithfully enforced, he should have these men sent back to the mines to resume their original 
sentences, he did not want to upset the local precedent nor send back the criminals, who were 
leading quiet lives and many of whom were old, so he sought Trajan‘s counsel. In response, 
Trajan told Pliny to send the men back to serve their original sentences in accordance with local 
law, excepting those who were too old or infirm to work the mines.
68
 As with widespread 
violations of law, long-established violations were addressed with irregular lenience and also 
created confusion for Roman officials, even men at the proconsular level like Pliny. 
Another noteworthy obstacle to the assurance of law abidance in the Anatolian provinces 
was the corruption of provincial officials found in cities across the region. For example, Pliny 
reveals that at celebrations of coming-of-age, marriage, entrance to a public office, and the 
dedication of public buildings, gifts of denarii were given as presents. Pliny decided that small 
gifts for ceremonial purposes should be permissible, but that large gifts should be considered 
illegal transfers of money or even bribes. Trajan, trusting that his legate knew the situation better 
than he, accepted Pliny‘s judgment on the matter.69 Pliny also reported to Trajan that a couple of 
expensive attempts at building an aqueduct in Nicomedia had been abandoned before their 
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completion. Trajan then instructed Pliny to investigate the abandoned building projects to see if 
―people have profited by this starting and abandoning of aqueducts.‖70 Trajan‘s concern suggests 
that embezzlement of funds was not uncommon. 
Dio‘s Discourses also supply plenty of evidence of provincial corruption. He reports that 
it was a common practice for the men of Rhodes to honor city benefactors and prominent 
Romans by inscribing their names on statues within their city, but that in order to save money, 
they were erasing the names of previous benefactors in order to do so.
71
 Although Dio 
encountered much opposition in his attempt to make this practice illegal,
72
 the punishment for 
the general defacing statues was execution
73
 and the punishment for erasing even one word from 
any official tablet was also execution.
74
 Nevertheless, because the majority of Rhodian officials 
favored this practice, despite its impiousness,
75
 the city did not cease changing inscriptions. In 
another example, Dio himself was accused of blocking the assembling of Prusa‘s boulê, of 
―misleading a wicked proconsul as to cause him to torture the people and to banish as many as 
possible, and even to put some to death,‖ of cooperating with a tyrant who would ―take by force 
the cities and their governments,‖ and of ensuring that all acts of the city‘s government were 
made to suit his wishes.
76
 Whether or not these facts are true or exaggerated, they express the 
real fears of the elite within Prusa. These accusations also reveal the sorts of ways that men 
would attempt or succeed in exploiting their cities. 
 In addition to corruption by the local legal administrators, Roman officials themselves, 
even up to the level of proconsul, were found guilty of disobeying laws and exploiting the 
provinces. With outstanding freedom in the use of imperium, a proconsul had even the ability to 
exact capital punishment on any non-Roman in his province.
77
 Therefore, it is no surprise that 
some proconsuls abused their authority and exceeded the limitations of their imperium. As a 
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safeguard against corrupt proconsuls, cities could appeal to Rome when they were treated 
unjustly. Sometimes these appeals would culminate in the prosecution of their governor in what 
was called a repetundae case.  These prosecutions usually occurred after the governor had left 
the province and therefore could not halt the conduct of a misbehaving proconsul.
78
 Additionally, 
because the life and dignity of a proconsul was at stake in a repetundae case, leniency in Rome 
made winning difficult for the provincials. Consequently, Augustus passed a new repetundae 
procedure in 4 BCE that allowed the simple restitution of value of what a magistrate had stolen. 
While this type of suit failed to punish corrupt officials, cases were more likely to be won and 
most of the damage would be repaired.
79
 The major crimes that would culminate in a repetundae 
charge were, for example, receipt of bribes and the exaction of violence (saevitia) upon 
provincials.
80 
 One famous example of a corrupt official is the case of Julius Bassus, who, according to 
Sherwin-White, was likely proconsul of Bithynia et Pontus during some period of time between 
100 and 102 and was prosecuted in 102-103, not too long before Pliny‘s proconsulship.81 In a 
letter to Cornelius Ursus in Book IV, Pliny describes Bassus‘s trial. Pliny, priding himself on 
being chosen to lay ―the foundations of the whole defence‖ of Bassus, proves to be a great source 
for this trial. Pliny reveals that Bassus was on trial for furta (thefts) and rapinas (pillaging) 
during his term as proconsul, while Bassus declares that he had just ―thoughtlessly accepted 
certain gifts from the provincials as their friend.‖ After the prosecution and defense were heard, 
two men proposed punishments for Bassus. Baebius Macer ―proposed that Bassus should be 
dealt with under the law dealing with the restitutions of monies extorted‖ and backed his 
proposal with strict adherence to law, while Caepio Hippo proposed ―that his penalty should be 
assessed by commission without loss of status‖ and backed his proposal by the Senate‘s ability to 
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reduce the severity of punishment under special circumstances—the present circumstance being 
the existing precedent of Bassus‘s actions. Both proposals had support, but Caepio‘s was passed. 
Pliny reports that there were crowds of people delighted at the result and attributes Bassus‘s 
success to public sympathy, his name, and his pitiable figure, ―bent with the afflictions and 
poverty of his old age.‖82 Regardless of Bassus‘s success in court, however, we know that all of 
Bassus‘s acts in Bithynia and Pontus were nevertheless annulled, as Pliny reports in a letter to 
Trajan.
83
 The extensive care taken in this case reveals how serious the Romans were about 
preventing proconsular corruption. In addition to providing a strong example of corruption itself, 
this case, because within is revealed that Bassus‘s actions had ―precedent,‖ demonstrates a 
tradition of proconsuls testing the limits of their imperia in Asia Minor. 
 In addition to Bassus‘s trial, the repetundae case in 106-107 of Varenus Rufus, who was 
proconsul of Bithynia et Pontus in 105-106, demonstrates Roman corruption within the 
provinces.
84
 Again, this case is revealed by Pliny, who spoke on behalf of Varenus. In this case, 
the Greeks provincials attempted to block Varenus‘s attempt to call witnesses from his province, 
but he was eventually allowed permission to do so.
85
 The Greeks attempted to reverse this 
permission by appealing to the consuls and to the emperor himself, but were not successful.
86
 In 
a later letter, Pliny reveals that the Greeks had invoked ―the law of restitution of money‖ against 
Varenus. Pliny also reports that in Varenus‘s case, both sides attempted to convince the emperor 
to favor one side over the other.
87
 This corruption case must have been significant if the emperor 
himself could have been involved. Ultimately, it appears from one of Pliny‘s letters that the 
charge against Varenus would be dropped because, as Pliny reports, it was regarded as ―an ill-
advised venture‖ for the Greeks to continue to undertake. This is likely because of the ―large 
number of prominent citizens‖ who acted on behalf of Varenus.88 
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 In addition to definite examples of corruption, we have general evidence of corrupt 
practices and evidence of fear of corruption. From the Roman side, we have Trajan‘s letter to 
Pliny, which was in response to Pliny‘s concern for allowing additional soldiers to accompany a 
prefect named Gavius Bassus. Trajan warned Pliny to distinguish between men who truly need 
their requests granted and men who wish to extend their privileges.
89
 Also, when Pliny asked 
Trajan how he could convince rich men in his province to borrow from the public funds, Trajan, 
fearing that Pliny may misuse his imperium, reminded him not to force loans on unwilling 
persons because such an action ―is not in accordance with the justice of [their] times.‖90 In 
another instance, Pliny, according to Sherwin-White, exposed himself ―to a formal charge under 
the extortion law,‖ although, fortunately for him, neither he nor Trajan took notice.91 In this 
instance, a man named Julius Largus, from Pontus, left his estate and 50,000 sesterces to Pliny, 
while leaving the rest of his money to the cities of Heraclea and Tium for building projects or 
―five-yearly games‖ in honor of Trajan.92 He did this, it being difficult to leave inheritances to 
municipalities, to ―ensure that his will would not be upset.‖93 Accepting such money, even if 
Pliny meant to invest it faithfully, could be grounds for a charge, but fortunately for him, Trajan 
simply acknowledged the will left to Pliny.
94
 Because corruption was common enough to arouse 
fears in Rome, many regulations, such as the duty of every governor and provincial quaestor to 
deposit copies of their accounts ―in two cities of the province and deliver a further copy to the 
treasury in Rome‖ after their tours of duty,95 were enacted to for preventative reasons. 
 We also have evidence from Dio concerning the corruption of Roman proconsuls.  In 
addressing the Nicomedians on concord with the Nicaeans, Dio argues that feuds between 
provincial cities have allowed and will continue to allow governors to exercise tyrannical power, 
since a governor could escape the wrath of one city by siding with its rival.
96
 Because cities or 
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groups of cities were able to undertake repetundae suits, Dio‘s claim that city rivalries play into 
the hands of such governors is more easily understood.
97
 Additionally, Dio claims that governors 
handed out titles of primacy to different cities in order to encourage such rivalries.
98 
 Although Rome took great care to see that Roman and local laws were in place and 
enforced in its Anatolian provinces, the administration process often challenged and hindered. 
Proconsuls had difficulty exercising their imperia even when problems were easily identifiable, 
when they lacked legal provisions to back their decisions, when cities possessed or reported to 
possess special privileges, and when law violations had become widespread or local precedent. 
Additionally, Greek political administrators and especially Roman officials created a challenge 
for Roman interests when they engaged in corrupt practices, such as exploiting their provinces or 
overstepping their imperia. 
 
II. Political Discord 
Another fundamental interest that Rome had in its provinces was the preservation of 
political stability. As Dio once put it, a city ―could never be obedient to law if it is foolish and 
disorderly.‖99 Additionally, when properly maintained, political order helped to establish 
efficiency for administrators and harmony for residents. In Asia Minor, it was not uncommon for 
political order to be challenged by rioting, demagogy, and rivalry within and between provincial 
cities. 
Rioting is the most visible example of political disorder that appears in Asia Minor‘s 
history and for Dio it is a common theme. Dio‘s Discourse 46 is a response to a mob that had 
suspected that Dio played a role in the increased prices of grain in Prusa that year while there 
was a grain shortage. During his oration, Dio was interrupted by his impatient audience that was 
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making a ―tumult.‖100 Also, during his oration to the riot, Dio chastises the type of person who 
would stone a fellow citizen, burn his house, and burn his family.
101
 These were evidently the 
threats that the mob had been making. 
  Years later, Dio reveals that the right to hold their ekklêsia in Prusa had been revoked and 
restored again by proconsul Varenus.
102
 This revocation had been in response to riots within the 
city and since ―governors and emperors rarely intervened in the internal affairs of the poleis of 
Asia Minor, and virtually only as a result of serious disorder,‖103 we know that the rioting had 
been significant.
104
 Bekker-Nielsen speculates that this suspension was generated by the violent 
and polarized political discourse that had sprung up in Prusa in light of the addition of the one 
hundred new city councilors. That Dio had feared division and factionalism in Prusa‘s politics 
appears to be well-founded. 
105 
 Also, in anticipation of Varenus‘s next visit to Prusa, Dio had several things to remind his 
disorderly fellow citizens. Having already seen the consequences of disorder and knowing that, 
as Strabo reports, the Prusans had once obtained freedom for ―having shown a friendly 
disposition towards the Romans in the conduct of their government,‖106 Dio wished for the city 
to make a good impression. Dio said that Varenus trusted Prusa and urged the city to retain this 
proconsul‘s support by keeping the city orderly, remembering that ―nothing which takes place in 
the cities escapes the attention of the proconsuls,‖ who receive reports of disorder and violations 
of law.
107
 Additionally, Dio compared Prusa‘s disorder to that of Athens at the close of the 
Peloponnesian War, which was only solved by bringing a curb ―from without,‖ the Spartan 
Lysander.
108 
 Dio did not want an external force taking hold of Prusa‘s affairs. Additionally, for 
the same purpose, Dio compared the conditions in a discordant city to ―intractable horses,‖ that 
are inevitably disciplined by their master.
109
 Dio then reminded his fellow citizens that an ideal 
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city is similar to a community-oriented swarm of bees. Although Dio admitted that there are 
always a few bees that devour the honey, the farmer of the bees, the Roman proconsul in this 
metaphor, would tolerate the small losses instead of throwing the bees into confusion.
110
 
However, when rioting was excessive, proconsuls evidently took action against the cities that 
were incapable of governing themselves successfully. 
 Generally, ―in the Greek cities when the have-nots found themselves in dire straits they 
had nothing to lose if they raided the notables‘ houses and attracted the attention of the Roman 
authorities with their riotous behavior.‖ Thus, although the social elite was interested in keeping 
the poor satisfied in order to prevent the intervention of the Romans in municipal affairs, rioting 
was a common and almost default response to hardship.
111
 For example, in addition to Prusa‘s 
riot, Sherwin-White reports ―a tantalizingly incomplete inscription from Nicomedia, of the 
proconsular period,‖ that ―mentions riots over the high rate of prices, which the council had 
difficulty in controlling, until apparently it invoked the aid of the proconsul.‖112 Riots, when 
severe, would temporarily disable cities to govern themselves effectively and would require the 
time and attention of the proconsuls, who would subsequently punish these cities. Rioting was 
problematic for all governing parties. 
 Another challenge for Roman authority was the rise of demagogues within provinces who 
upset the local political order. Dio himself is a prime example of a man who may have posed 
such a threat, although ultimately he decided to remain a philosopher instead of a politician. 
Pliny, in a letter to Trajan, mentions that by the law of Pompey, Bithynian cities may ―confer 
their citizenship on anyone they choose, provided that it is not someone who is already a citizen 
of another Bithynian city.‖ He also reveals that ―every city has several senators who hold 
citizenship elsewhere,‖ who clearly violate this law.113 Lintott claims that this ban is ―an attempt 
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to prevent a few men becoming dominant throughout the province.‖114 Dio possessed citizenship 
in his home city of Prusa, and in Nicomedia, Nicaea, and Apameia, a city which honored many 
Prusan notables with citizenship.
115
 Also, Dio, when speaking of his honors to the Apameians, a 
city that had also given citizenship to his father and grandfather, said that ―cities in general‖ and 
most of those ―of equal rank‖ with Apameia have granted him citizenship and even membership 
in the boulê.
116
 This suggests that Dio held honors in even more cities than those that we can 
identify. 
 In addition to his citizenship, Dio reveals in other orations that his influence in the 
Anatolian provinces was widespread and strong. With respect to other provincials, Dio claims 
that he had such a widespread reputation that ―many people in many lands‖ asked him to ―take 
charge of their public affairs.‖117 Dio was so influential within his own city that, although he 
ultimately refused the honor, many of his fellow citizens attempted to make him archôn.
118
 Dio 
was even an honored friend of the Apameians and held reasonable clout in the city‘s affairs, even 
though he was from Prusa, the city‘s rival.119 In addition to his reputation among other 
provincials, Dio also possessed influential connections in Rome, including proconsuls and to 
some degree, Nerva and Trajan.
120
 Although these connections were resented by some people in 
his province, they could also be used to bolster his position in the province.
121
  
 While it is unclear whether Dio really was a threat to the political order of the Anatolian 
provinces, the accusations made against him suggest that he was truly a potential menace and 
that other men like Dio had become tyrannical. Dio was accused of tyrannical and demagogical 
actions many times.
122
 Some of his boasts in his orations could only aggravate these claims. For 
example, Dio compared himself to Socrates with respect to his influence within his native city 
and he boasted that his bill of indictment was longer than Socrates‘s.123 Additionally, in an 
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oration to Tarsus, Dio, perhaps with intent to be humorous, actually called himself a 
demagogue.
124
 Specifically, Dio was accused of enrolling his friends and allies into the newly-
expanded Prusan boulê.
125
 As Bekker-Nielsen notes, ―that [Dio] refutes this allegation in some 
detail indicates that his fellow-citizens had taken it seriously.‖126 One bill of indictment against 
Dio included misleading a proconsul, perhaps Bassus or Varenus, ensuring the success of a 
tyrant, perhaps the same proconsul, and bribing the masses with enough money to prevent legal 
reproach.
127
 Furthermore, it is likely that Dio‘s son became an archôn and although Dio denies it, 
many Prusans believe that Dio used his influence to win that position for his son.
128
 Also, when 
Dio spoke of his plan to build a grand colonnade to rival the wondrous public works in other 
cities, he was called a tyrant because he had to remove some prominent existing buildings, 
including, as he says, a temple of Zeus.
129 
Fear of demagogues was not limited to people living in the provinces, but also affected 
Rome itself. For example, Plutarch, as did other Romans no doubt, held contempt for ―certain 
inhabitants of Chios, Galatia, and Bithynia who are never content with the fame and power they 
enjoy in their own cities, but hanker without any real hope after a place in the Senate and, still 
not satisfied, aspire to a praetorship or even a consulate.‖130 Men like Dio, regardless of their 
actual intentions, did possess the wherewithal to upset political order for their own ends and to 
become problems not only to their fellow provincials, but also to Roman governance. Even if 
their intentions were benign, they created noteworthy alarm simply because of the possibility of 
demagogy. 
Another type of political disorder, rivalries between notable individuals within Greek 
cities, often impaired the progress of politics on a local level and sometimes jeopardized the 
integrity of the system itself. As Bekker-Nielsen observes, ―friendly competition and social 
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rivalry within the agôn could easily get out of control and once public order had broken down, it 
was difficult to restore.‖131 One example, mentioned in the previous section of this study, is the 
rivalry between Dio and Flavius Archippus that made itself known by use of the Roman legal 
system. Archippus‘s intent to harm Dio brought Claudius Eumolpus, who formally made the 
charge against Dio, into the squabble.
132
 It would not be surprising for individual rivalries within 
the social elite to expand into larger feuds in such a manner. This charge, however trivial from a 
strict legal standpoint,
133
 wasted the Romans‘ time and also delayed the progress of local 
political action—Dio‘s public building project.134  
 In another instance, Pliny asked Trajan for an architect to examine some building because 
a local architect had reported that a gymnasium was flawed in design. This architect was the rival 
of the one who had made the designs for the gymnasium.
135
 Sherwin-White argues that the 
purpose of Pliny‘s letter describing these public building problems was to convince Trajan to 
send an architect and not to gain permission for the projects, as the projects were already in 
progress.
136
 He claims that Pliny required an independent opinion, since he could not ―trust the 
local men, who were involved in the civic factions.‖137 Again, personal rivalries slowed down 
the progress of municipal procedures. 
 Cities were also affected by rivalries on a larger scale that took the form of polarized 
political bodies and official or unofficial factions. Within the context of Greek cities, Bekker-
Nielsen explains the concept of stásis as ―disruptive conflict within the community‖ and claims 
that ―the fear of civil violence among the many or of oppression by the few was real enough, and 
well founded.‖138 Dio had a particular interest in stásis from a philosophical standpoint. This 
theme appears throughout his political orations. He constantly emphasized the importance of 
harmony and berates the type of people who would jeopardize it.
139 
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 In many of his orations, Dio reveals the stásis that had existed within the cities he visited 
throughout Asia Minor. In Nicaea, he lectured its citizens about the advantages of homónoia, or 
harmony, within cities. This most likely served as a response to a previous period of conflict in 
the city or a fear of coming conflict.
140
 Also, Dio spoke of political discord in Tarsus between the 
city‘s ekklêsia and its boulê arising often and with only short and uneasy periods of concord 
between outbreaks.
141
 Additionally, in addressing a general body of citizens at Tarsus, he 
referred to the people‘s current grievance against philosophers. Although the grievance in 
particular is unknown, it is known that philosophers played a prominent part in the affairs of 
Tarsus, which suggests that there had been discord between the citizenry and certain power 
players in their city‘s politics.142 Dio also denounced the political clubs in Greek cities, fearing 
that they would destroy homónoia.
143
 Dio revealed that ―councilors divided into factions, 
hetaireiai, forming groups around the leading figures in conflict.‖144 Overall, Dio‘s repeated 
references to factionalism and intra-city discord suggest that they were common within Greek 
cities and that they were serious enough to create fear and worry among the provincials. 
 Bekker-Nielson observes that as ―the social structure of republican Rome had a good deal 
in common with contemporary Greek cities,‖ Rome also possessed ―the Greek horror of civic 
violence.‖145 Just as with Dio‘s Discourses, Pliny‘s Epistulae indicate signs of political unrest 
caused by political factions in Asia Minor, at least as far as the province of Bithynia et Pontus is 
concerned. For example, Pliny writes to Trajan about a widespread fire in Nicomedia that burned 
while the provincials simply watched it burning. He suggests that he should assemble a company 
of fireman in the city to prevent future disasters. However, although Trajan admits that there are 
such companies elsewhere, the emperor rejects Pliny‘s suggestion out of fear that the company, 
even if limited to 150 men as per Pliny‘s suggestion, would become a political club like others 
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which were ―responsible for the political disturbances in [Pliny‘s] province.‖146 Pliny‘s request, 
although denied, should not come as a surprise. Fires were a real concern for the Roman Empire. 
Several great fires in Rome are known, ―despite the organization of the vigils, some 7,000 
strong.‖ Also, there existed bodies of firemen in Italy and in the Latin-speaking provinces. It is 
evident that Pliny meant only to solve a problem in the same manner in which it is solved in 
Italy.
147
 If this practice were eagerly implemented elsewhere, then Trajan‘s fear of political clubs 
must be appropriate or else paranoid in a way not befitting an emperor who is overwhelmingly 
pragmatic and rational otherwise.  
In another instance, Pliny sent a petition to Trajan from Amisus that asked permission to 
form a benefit society. Trajan granted permission to form this benefit society because the city 
was ―free and confederate‖ and was consequently allowed to make its own laws. Trajan 
expressed, however, that he only granted permission because he trusted that contributions to the 
society would help the poor and would not be ―used for riotous and unlawful assemblies.‖ He 
also reminded Pliny that these societies are strictly forbidden in all cities subject to Roman 
law.
148
 Again, the fear of political societies must have been warranted if this was the only reason 
not to form a group to aid the poor. Rome was interested in the well-being of its provincials and 
would otherwise have encouraged its provinces‘ initiative in providing for the poor in a fashion 
that would cost nothing to Rome. Although the Roman examples of political clubs do not display 
the discord and destruction that could be suffered as a result, they do reveal how factions were 
serious enough to demand the attention and concern of an emperor. 
On a grander level, Asia Minor found itself plagued by rivalry between cities and groups 
of cities, in addition to the smaller conflicts that took place within cities. Dio reveals that Prusa 
and Apameia were rivals, probably because of economic concerns
149
 and he likens their 
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―wrangling and hatred‖ to an insurrection within one city, due to the close proximity of Prusa 
and Apameia.
150
 When addressing Tarsus, Dio reveals that the city was quarreling with Aegae, 
which had ―developed a prejudice against [Tarsus] as being obnoxious and oppressive toward the 
other cities,‖151 competing with Mallus over territorial claims to land of ―no value,‖152 and 
suffering criticisms from many smaller cities, such as Soli and Adana.
153
 In this instance, it was 
not simply a matter of two groups at odds, but a large number of smaller cities expressing 
opposition simultaneously or cooperatively against the largest city of the province. Dio also 
spent quite a bit of time trying to end the rivalry between Nicomedia and Nicaea, dedicating an 
entire oration to the task.
154
 Dio, revealing just how common feuds between cities were, 
contributed some more examples when he offhandedly mentioned quarrels between the 
Apameians and the men of Antioch and between the Smyrnaeans and the Ephesians.
155 
 Dio was particularly sensitive to the issue of feuding cities because he knew the Romans‘ 
perspective on the matter. For example, he told the Nicomedians that they must ―give the 
provincial governors occasion to respect [them]‖ by being ―concerned for the welfare of the 
whole Bithynian people.‖156 He also meant to avoid laughter and humiliation from Romans, who 
saw the struggle for primacy as a petty conflict.
157
 Dio also knew that inter-city rivalry was a 
hassle for Roman proconsuls, who had to respond to problems related to intense competition, 
such as overspending in public building projects that were meant to outdo those of other cities.
158
 
Most importantly, Dio feared that too much rivalry would require intervention from the Romans. 
He twice made a metaphor comparing the Greek cities to horses pulling a chariot. If horses are 
not obedient to their driver and instead fight amongst themselves and pull away from one 
another, ―the danger increases in proportion to the strength and speed of the horses.‖ Because 
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this discord endangered the driver of the chariot, Rome, proconsuls or even Rome itself, if the 
discord were serious enough, would, Dio feared, pull the metaphorical reins.
159 
 A common cause for city rivalries was competition over titles, status markers, and the 
favor of the Roman proconsul or emperor. As Bekker-Nielsen observes, ―cities battled to 
maintain and reinforce their position vis-à-vis their neighboring communities.‖160 A telling 
example of this type of rivalry is that between Nicaea and Nicomedia.
161
 Dio, who delivered an 
oration to the Nicomedians on this subject, revealed that the root of this conflict was not social 
difference, economic competition, or even a territorial claim, but titles and nominal primacy.
162
 
One title that the cities fought over was neôkoros, a title that denoted the presence of the imperial 
cult within the city.
163
 Although Nicomedia‘s more active and long-term involvement in 
establishing imperial cults put the city ahead of its rival, Nicaea still fancied itself ―prôtê polis 
tês eparcheias,‖ or ―first city of the province,‖ indicating long-term involvement in the 
competition for titles.
164
 These cities‘ rivalry was problematic for its players because, as Dio 
states, smaller cities would take advantage of Nicomedia and Nicaea by allowing these larger 
quarreling cities to grow dependent upon them for support.
165
 Additionally, because these 
smaller cities aligned themselves with one or the other, the scale of the feud grew beyond two 
large cities into a rivalry between groups of cities. This rivalry was also problematic because, as 
Dio says, proconsuls of Bithynia et Pontus would avoid consequences for misbehaving in one 
city by winning the support of its rival.
166
 Although Dio tried to end the competition over titles 
between Nicomedia and Nicaea, we know that he was not persuasive because, for example, 
Nicomedia continued to claim exclusive primacy on their coinage for some time.
167 
 City rivalries, especially those most devoted to competition over titles, were likely fueled 
by a desire to receive praise by notable people. One such notable was Dio, who freely shared 
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praise to nearly every city he visited, although he denied that he was a flatterer.
168
 In other 
orations, Dio praises Rhodes, which he declares is ―the most prosperous of all of the Greeks‖169 
and that the city had pre-eminence ―over all other cities save one‖ (Rome),170 Tarsus, which he 
calls ―greatest of all the cities of Cilicia,‖171 Celaenae, which he calls ―inferior to none of the first 
rank,‖172 and Nicomedia, which he calls a metropolis.173 Dio even expresses his preference of his 
native city of Prusa over Athens, Argos, and Sparta, ―the foremost and most distinguished of the 
Greek cities,‖174 and praises the city as ―far superior to all other communities.‖175 Cities sought 
to be recorded favorably in histories as well. Such praise is found in the Geōgraphiká of Strabo, 
who, for example, praises Nicaea as ―the metropolis of Bithynia‖176 and calls Apameia ―a great 
emporium of Asia,‖ which was ―second only to Ephesus.‖177 
 Although city rivalries are discussed in many ancient sources, Dio may have overstated 
their severity. The topics of homónoia, concord, and stásis, discord, were ―favourite themes in 
Greek political philosophy generally and in the work of [Dio].‖178 Dio spends much of his time 
speaking about these topics on philosophical terms.
179
 Bekker-Nielson notes, for example, that 
Dio‘s oration on concord in Apameia is focused on the abstract virtues of homónoia. It does not 
discuss mundane realities.
180 
 Dio also had a different outlook on the provinces of Asia Minor than did the majority of 
the Greeks living there. He viewed the region in an imperial context, while most provincials 
possessed an atomistic view of their cities. Dio identified that small cities would never become 
truly great by themselves.
181
 This may be why in his oration to the Nicomedians, he imagines 
Nicomedia achieving concord not only with the Nicaea, but also with other cities such as 
Ephesus and Smyrna. Dio may have had a grander scheme to unite cities across Asia Minor for 
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some grander purpose.
182
 Dio returns to this theme in an oration in Prusa, in which he speaks of 
his desire to make Prusa ―head of a federation of cities.‖183 
 Political discord was taxing for Rome to prevent and was potentially devastating to 
Roman interests. Riots upset local governments and often required Roman resources and effort in 
order to restore order. Demagogy had the potential to temporarily prevent the enforcement of 
local and Roman law in favor of the demagogue‘s interests instead of Rome‘s. The fear of 
demagogy itself created contention between local officials. Additionally, individual rivalries and 
factions generated confusion within cities, while city rivalries affected provinces at large. 
Rome‘s fear of these concerns demonstrates that it had to carefully monitor its provinces in Asia 
Minor in order to maintain peaceful control. 
 
III. Infrastructure and Finances 
The Romans also had a keen interest in the maintenance of provincial infrastructure and 
finances. Once again, the provinces of Asia Minor proved to be a challenge for Roman interests. 
Many of their public works were in disrepair, many cities lacked fundamental resources like 
water supplies, and many cities were financially irresponsible. 
Throughout Pliny‘s Epistulae, he reports the sorry state of important public buildings 
throughout Bithynia et Pontus, even those not yet fully built. The public bath at Prusa was, 
according to Pliny, ―old and dilapidated.‖ Although the people were ―anxious‖ for it to be 
rebuilt, it had been run down for a considerable period of time. Furthermore, the city required the 
emperor‘s approval, the consent of the proconsul, and their proconsul‘s aid in organizing the 
necessary funding in order to begin rebuilding the path. This suggests that it was not easy for 
provincials to keep buildings in working order.
184
 In Nicomedia, a fire broke out that ―destroyed 
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many private houses and also two public buildings (the Elder Citizens‘ Club and the Temple of 
Isis).‖ According to Pliny, this was allowed to happen because the people ―stood watching the 
disaster without bestirring themselves to do anything to stop it‖ and because ―there is not a single 
fire engine anywhere in the town, not a bucket nor any apparatus for fighting a fire.‖185 Although 
Pliny suggested forming a company of firemen in order to prevent such problems in the future, 
Trajan did not grant this request, letting Pliny simply provide firefighting equipment for the 
citizens.
186
 Although we cannot assume that fires were a very regular occurrence, this example 
does suggest that provincials did not always have the wherewithal to protect their investments.  
Pliny also reported that the theatre at Nicaea was unfinished, sinking, unstable, and 
showing immense cracks. The state of the building was such that Pliny wondered whether it 
would be best simply to demolish it. He also reported that the benefactors of the theater had 
ambitions to provide the building with embellishments such as colonnades and a gallery, even 
though the building itself remained unfinished.
187
 Also at Nicaea, a fire having destroyed their 
old gymnasium, a new and grand gymnasium was in the process of being built. This project, 
despite its grand scheme, was nevertheless faulty, both because the buildings were too far apart 
and because, according to an architect with whom Pliny spoke, ―the walls cannot support the 
superstructure.‖188 Trajan, whose tone in his letters is usually friendly and pragmatic, 
condescendingly responded to this overambitious building project by exclaiming: ―these poor 
Greeks all love a gymnasium!‖ He also told Pliny that they must be satisfied with one that ―suits 
their real needs.‖189 In yet another example, Pliny reported that the people of Claudiopolis had 
begun excavating a public bath out of a mountainside and Trajan lamented that this bath had 
been ―started in an unsuitable site.‖190 Pliny also reported that there existed a ―filthy sewer, a 
disgusting eyesore which gives off a noxious stench‖ that ran alongside a beautiful street in 
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Amastris, which not only tarnished the appearance of the city, but threatened the health of its 
inhabitants. It is unclear why Pliny would have needed Trajan‘s consent to fix this problem, but 
he received it.
191 
Pliny also reported the ―unsightly ruins‖ of a large house in Dio‘s home city of Prusa. 
These ruins could not be removed because the house had been left by the will of a Claudius 
Polyaenus to Emperor Claudius and because the ground may have been consecrated. Although 
the people of Prusa were respectful enough to leave standing such an eyesore out of respect for a 
deified emperor, the reason that the house had fallen into ruin in the first place, according to 
Pliny, was from spoliata (pillaging) and neglecta (neglect). Now the citizens, who were eager to 
have this blemish removed from their city, required the aid of their proconsul and the consent of 
their emperor to do anything about it. Fortunately for them, Pliny suggested to Trajan the 
building of a new bath on the site and this plan was approved.
192
 In a similar case in the same 
city, Dio hoped to replace some old and rundown buildings with a building project of his own. 
However, Dio was opposed by many of his fellow citizens and he describes it thusly:  
But there was a lot of talk … to the effect that I am dismantling the city; that 
I have laid it waste, virtually banishing the inhabitants; that everything has been 
destroyed, obliterated, nothing left … One might have supposed that the 
Propylaea at Athens were being tampered with, or the Parthenon, or that we were 
wrecking the Heraeum of the Samians, or the Didymeium of the Milesians, or the 
temple of Artemis at Ephesus, instead of disgraceful, ridiculous ruins … 
structures that used to make you blush, aye, be utterly confounded when the 
proconsuls essayed to enter, while men who bore you malice would gloat over 
you and laugh at your discomfiture  … shanties, moreover, in tumbledown 
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condition, held up by props, so that at the stroke of the hammer they quivered and 
threatened to fall apart.
193 
Although Dio‘s purpose here was only to justify his actions, he does paint a very vivid picture of 
the condition of many buildings in Prusa. And with Prusa being a relatively well-off city, it is 
likely that there were buildings just as rundown, if not in greater disrepair, in other cities. The 
resistance of Dio‘s opponents in this matter is also troubling, for it is apparent, by Dio feeling the 
need to defend himself, that public building projects, even ones that were clearly advantageous to 
the city, could be delayed or even halted. The geographer Strabo describes similar resistance to 
public building in the city of Ephesus, on the western coast of Asia Minor in the third century 
BCE. He reports that when Lysimachus, a king, wished to build a wall around the city of 
Ephesus, the inhabitants did not wish to move their homes and buildings to accommodate it, so, 
in order to ensure that this project would be approved, Lysimachus, during a heavy rain, blocked 
the sewers of the city, inundated its buildings, and was able to bring about the reorganization of 
the city by its inhabitants, who were then happy to make the change.
194 
Dio also reveals a tendency for organizers and builders of public works to be careless in 
planning and building. While Dio, he says, took earnest care in taking measurements, finding 
space, and making computations in order that his building project would be a success, he reports 
that ―in other cities many public works have been ruined for lack of planning.‖195 Dio also 
reported that his domestic affairs, after having returned from his exile, were in a ―ruinous 
state.‖196 This is especially surprising, because Dio still had family in Prusa, but apparently they 
were not diligent with the upkeep of Dio‘s property. It appears to be a general trend for 
provincials in Asia Minor to tolerate buildings in disrepair and even ruins, especially in Prusa. 
Contrary to Rome‘s interest in the diligent upkeep of public works in its provinces, even the 
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wealthiest of Anatolian cities housed ruins, crumbling and cracking public works, irresponsible 
builders, and much internal opposition to building maintenance. 
Pliny‘s Epistulae and the Dio‘s Discourses reveal that, even though Rome wished 
reasonable well-being for its provincials, in some cities in Asia Minor, they did not have easy 
access to even the most basic supplies. For example, Pliny reported that the town of Sinope had 
no access to a water supply. Pliny, doing his duty as proconsul, funded the surveying of sixteen 
miles of land between the town and a water supply, offered to organize the funds necessary to 
build an aqueduct there, and received the emperor‘s permission to build.197 The town would not 
have been able to build this aqueduct without his aid, despite having the financial wherewithal to 
fund it. Pliny also reported to Trajan that the people of Nicomedia, one of the larger cities in 
Bithynia et Pontus, lacked an aqueduct even though they had twice attempted to build an 
aqueduct before abandoning the project. Pliny hoped to make a third attempt at supplying the 
city with a water supply and Trajan was supportive, though angered by the money wasted in the 
previous attempts.
198 
Dio, in one of his orations, reported a riot in Prusa in response to a grain shortage. Not 
only was the lack of grain severe enough to provoke a riot, but Dio, chastising the mob, said that, 
although the price of grain in Prusa was terrible, that ―there are cities in which it is always at that 
price, when conditions are best!‖199 If we can believe that Dio did not make that statement 
merely for rhetorical effect, then it is clear that other cities in Asia Minor lacked sufficient food 
supplies. Although grain shortages were periodic and by no means the norm, this particular 
shortage was severe enough for Dio, one of Prusa‘s elite, to not have ―enough for [his] own 
needs.‖200 Evidently, insufficient access to basic supplies was costly to the health and resources 
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of provincial cities and provided the have-nots with grounds for hatred for and uprisings against 
the local elite. 
Although Sherwin-White boldly clams, on the one hand, that ―there is no sign of any 
economic malaise in Bithynia‖ during Pliny‘s time,201 it is clear, on the other hand, that the 
Anatolian provinces did have an enormous problem with financial mismanagement. It is for this 
reason in particular that Pliny, a veteran of Roman finance, was selected specifically by Emperor 
Trajan to investigate each city‘s finances in Bithynia et Pontus.202 As Lintott observes, local 
Greek governments did not always handle self-governance well and ―their financial 
embarrassment was an excellent excuse for roman intervention.‖203 Of the many ways in which 
finances were misused, the most wasteful was the erection of overly ambitious and extravagant 
public buildings.
204 
 Pausanias, a Greek geographer living the second century, determined the prestige of a 
Greek pólis by its public buildings and amenities in addition to its legal status. Such amenities, 
he determined, included ―the theatre, council house, and agora‖ at minimum and, if possible, 
―monumental temples, a gymnasium and colonnaded streets.‖205 This common attitude explains 
why the Greeks were so eager to devote their finances to public works. Public funds, the 
generosity of private benefactors, or some combination of the two were responsible for financing 
these projects.
206
 A particularly troublesome problem arose when projects depended on money 
from private benefactors because, as Dio‘s own project suggests, benefactors who had been 
eager to promise money for a project were often resistant to actually handing over the funding.
207
 
While it is true that a proconsul had the ability ―to intervene and collect the sums promised for 
the construction of some building‖208 and that, at least legally, failure to make good on a promise 
of benefaction could incur debt not only upon the promised benefactor but also upon his heirs,
209
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suggesting that such promises were regulated, Dio‘s experience proves that project builders had 
little help in securing their funds in a timely manner. When resistance to the collection of funds 
delayed the progress of the building, finances were used suboptimally and when such problems 
delayed projects to the point of allowing these incomplete projects to fall into neglect, as some 
buildings did, according to Pliny, or when these problems halted a project altogether, public and 
private funds were severely squandered. Another problem with funding public works that created 
the same problems by delaying construction was the widespread tendency for men 
commissioning a project to keep their financial accounts hidden.
210 
 Another problem associated with the funding of public building projects was the common 
practice of men running their families and themselves into debt by overspending as benefactors. 
For example, Julius Piso of Amisus, who had been illegally granted 40,000 denarii of public 
funds, was unable to repay his debt after he bankrupted himself by spending the money on the 
city.
211
 Dio, who reports that his personal finances had grown thin due to his participation in 
funding public works, had a similar problem.
212
 He had lost much of his property and wealth 
when he had gone into exile and when his sister died, being unable to collect the property that 
she had been holding for him. Additionally, he had resorted to taking out a loan in order to 
purchase his farm and had incurred other debts.
213
 Despite these setbacks, he still invested in 
public works, perhaps against his better judgment. Similarly, Dio‘s grandfather had spent on 
Prusa ―all that he had inherited from his father and grandfather, until he had nothing left.‖214 
More generally, Sherwin-White observes, citing Plutarch, that it was common for men to borrow 
―from friends to make a great show of liturgies.‖215 
Pliny, who made a point to investigate finances, provides numerous examples of careless 
spending on incomplete building projects and on other public and private ventures. For example 
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the unfinished theater in Nicaea, which was sinking and cracking, had already cost ten million 
sesterces. Pliny expected that this structure, which he considered to be ―none too solid,‖ might be 
demolished. Furthermore, the benefactors of the project were more concerned with supplying a 
colonnade and a gallery for the theater, among other things, than completing the building 
itself.
216
 Again in Nicaea, the citizens spent ―a large sum‖ on building a new gymnasium ―on a 
much larger and more expensive scale than before.‖ Unfortunately, Pliny reports that the 
buildings were poorly planned and too scattered and that an architect had said that the walls 
could not support the superstructure.
217
 This project, which wasted funds not only by being more 
extravagant than necessary, would require additional repair costs if it would not be abandoned 
altogether. Pliny also reported that in Nicomedia, two separate attempts to build an aqueduct 
were abandoned, costing 3,318,000 sesterces and 200,000 sesterces respectively. Pliny wrote to 
Trajan, hoping to make a third attempt at supplying the city with a water supply and Trajan 
approved of this project. However, Trajan worried that ―people have profited by this starting and 
abandoning of aqueducts‖ and ordered Pliny to make an inquiry.218 As Sherwin-White points 
out, ―those in charge of public works were very apt to embezzle the building funds.‖219 Pliny also 
reports the ―misapplication‖ of the Trajan‘s generosity in spending funds raised by admission 
fees to the town council in Claudiopolis for the purpose of excavating a public bath ―in a hollow 
at the foot of a mountain,‖ which was an ―unsuitable‖ site for such a project.220 
In addition to the careless spending of money while attempting to build public works, 
Pliny reports other financial wastefulness. Pliny reports that Byzantium, just across the Bosporus 
from Asia Minor, had been spending 12,000 sesterces to send a loyal address to the emperor 
annually and 3,000 sesterces to send official greetings to the governor of Moesia. Consequently, 
Pliny suspended the first expense and suggested to Trajan to cut the second expense as well. 
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Trajan applauded Pliny for cutting the 12,000 sesterce-expense and confirmed his desire to cut 
the other expense as well.
221
 More generally, Pliny reported that in Prusa, ―large sums of money 
are detained in the hands of private individuals for various reasons, and further sums are paid out 
for quite illegal purposes.‖ Trajan, having learned that the accounts of cities throughout Bithynia 
et Pontus ―are evidently in confusion,‖ sent Pliny to correct them.222 
Rome showed strong interests in ensuring the maintenance of public works, the basic 
needs of the provincials, and the proper application of city finances in Asia Minor. However, 
resistance and indifference to the upkeep of buildings by provincials required that Rome inspect 
cities and sometimes organize building maintenance. Also, many cities that lacked even basic 
supplies were unable to secure them without the help of Roman organizers. Additionally, 
provincials freely used public funds not for their proper purposes, but irresponsibly and selfishly. 
This was troubling enough for an emperor to send a legate on a special mission to put an end to 
irresponsible and illegal municipal spending. 
 
Conclusion 
 The provinces of Asia Minor presented countless challenges to Roman interests. Many of 
these challenges, such as unlawfulness and scarcity of resources, can be expected to have 
appeared in provinces throughout the Empire, but many other challenges, such as intense inter-
city rivalry and the allocation of funds for extravagant public building projects, arose particularly 
because of Greek culture and might only be found in other Eastern provinces. 
 Although the Epistulae of Pliny and the Discourses of Dio provide a detailed view of the 
affairs of provinces in Asia Minor, and especially of Bithynia et Pontus, nevertheless, as Bekker-
Nielsen states, ―they also reveal how little we know,‖ especially about local politics and 
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politicians.
223
 Even though we have more evidence with which to piece together the situation in 
this region than for most others, we lack sufficient evidence to make certain observations and 
instead must hope to identify tendencies. As much as a few examples of incomplete and rundown 
building projects or of insufficient access to legal documents for proconsuls may suggest general 
phenomena, it is always possible for the extant examples to be isolated cases. 
 Nevertheless, this case study does show that Asia Minor posed significant challenges to 
Roman interests. It is not surprising that Trajan would send an expert of finances to Bithynia et 
Pontus, a province notable for financial irresponsibility, nor is it that Dio, an accomplished orator 
with an understanding of Rome‘s interests in and perspective of the Greek world that was 
uncommon for a Greek native, would dedicate himself to preserving political stability so that, as 
he hoped at least, the Romans would not have to intervene in local affairs. It is difficult to 
determine how successful Rome was in protecting its interests in Asia Minor, but it is certain that 
the Anatolian provinces required much attention and care. 
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